Labor Organizing in the Age of Surveillance by Garden, Charlotte
Saint Louis University Law Journal 
Volume 63 
Number 1 Law, Technology, and the 
Organization of Work (Fall 2018) 
Article 5 
2018 
Labor Organizing in the Age of Surveillance 
Charlotte Garden 
Seattle University School of Law, gardenc@seattleu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charlotte Garden, Labor Organizing in the Age of Surveillance, 63 St. Louis U. L.J. (2018). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/lj/vol63/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Saint Louis University Law Journal by an authorized editor of Scholarship Commons. For more 
information, please contact Susie Lee. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
 
55 
LABOR ORGANIZING IN THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 
CHARLOTTE GARDEN* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
How will big data and the rise of sophisticated and accessible workplace 
surveillance techniques affect union organizing? This Article discusses recent 
advances in workplace surveillance technology, including systems designed to 
collect vast quantities of data about what goes on in a workplace: when 
employees leave their work stations; to whom they talk; what they type; how 
quickly they complete tasks; even their mood. Moreover, the rise of “big data” 
means that employers can analyze this data to obtain an increasingly detailed 
and sophisticated picture of what workers are doing and how they feel about 
their work.  
While these new technologies raise a host of privacy and other concerns,1 
this Article focuses on some of the ways they could chill workers’ collective 
action. Most obviously, workers may fear that anything they say could be 
electronically overheard by a system designed to help employers identify 
malcontents and agitators. Beyond that, systems designed to juice every ounce 
of productivity out of workers could simply leave them without the downtime at 
work that could lead to sharing information about their own workplace 
experiences and building trust. Yet the National Labor Relations Act (the 
“NLRA”)—a statute drafted to protect “the right of employees to organize and 
bargain collectively”2 —has remarkably little to say about much employer 
surveillance. Instead, employers are mostly free to implement surveillance 
measures for purposes such as promoting productivity or improving security, 
even if those measures could also chill union organizing. This has been true since 
the days when workplace surveillance mostly had to be accomplished by human 
beings, conjuring up men in trench coats who would follow workplace rabble-
rousers to the union hall in the evenings. The shift to surveillance by closed-
 
* Co-Associate Dean for Research & Faculty Development, and Associate Professor, Seattle 
University School of Law. I am grateful for feedback on and discussion of this piece during St. 
Louis University’s 2018 symposium on Law, Technology, and the Organization of Work, as well 
as for excellent editing by the members of the St. Louis University Law Journal. 
 1. See generally, Ifeoma Ajunwa, Algorithms at Work: Productivity Monitoring Platforms 
and Wearable Technology as the New Data-Centric Research Agenda for Employment and Labor 
Law, 63 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 21 (2019). 
 2. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). 
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circuit cameras and keystroke loggers placed the National Labor Relations 
Board’s (the “NLRB”) surveillance doctrine under stress—but omnipresent 
listening devices that collect mass amounts of data to be analyzed by computer 
could render that doctrine nearly useless. 
This Article discusses recent advances in employers’ surveillance 
capabilities, and what they mean for union organizing. Part II discusses new 
workplace surveillance technology. Then, Part III discusses the (limited) extent 
to which employer surveillance can constitute an unfair labor practice. Part IV 
draws the previous two parts together, arguing that the NLRA is not an adequate 
response to the unique challenges to collective action that are posed by new 
surveillance technology. 
II.  MODERN WORKPLACE SURVEILLANCE 
Like many other aspects of work, technology has transformed worker 
surveillance. Employers have at their disposal an increasingly sophisticated set 
of tools with which to monitor every aspect of employees’ work—and 
sometimes their private lives, too.  
It is already commonplace and common knowledge that employers can use 
keyloggers and other tracking software to monitor what their employees type, 
what websites they visit and how much time they spend there, and more.3 But 
employer surveillance need not stop at employees’ desks. Employers can also 
rely on closed circuit cameras to learn when employees get up and walk away 
from the computer, or they can require employees to use radio-frequency 
identification badges to enter rooms on the employer’s premises—thereby 
creating a log of each employee’s locations throughout the day.4 Further, many 
of these tools are not easily detectable by employees, unless employers decide 
that it is in their interest to be forthright about their workplace monitoring: just 
as a homeowner might post a security system logo in the window in the hope of 
deterring burglars, an employer might predict that employees’ awareness that 
they are being monitored might itself change their behavior.  
This technology reached maturity years ago, and it shows no sign of falling 
out of favor; to the contrary, its use seems to be on the rise. Surveys of employer 
behavior have obvious limitations, but for what they are worth, they generally 
reflect increasing surveillance of employees. For example, in a 2007 survey by 
the American Management Association and the ePolicy Institute, two thirds of 
the 304 employer respondents stated that they monitored their employees’ use 
 
 3. See Matthew W. Finkin, Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law, 72 CHI.-KENT 
L. REV. 221, 262–63 (1996). 
 4. Id. 
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of the Internet, and blocked access to certain websites.5 That same survey 
showed that nearly half of respondents used keystroke loggers and reviewed 
their employees’ computer files, with most of these employers providing 
advance notice of this monitoring.6 Further, when compared to earlier versions 
of the same survey, this study suggests that employer surveillance is on the rise.7  
In addition, employers now have at their disposal increasingly sophisticated, 
subtle, and effective means of surveilling their employees’ actions, 
communications, and even attitudes, both inside and outside of work. For 
example, a profile of the Silicon Valley firm Humanyze recounts that both the 
company’s own employees and its clients’ employees are outfitted with “a 
microphone that picks up whether they are talking to one another; Bluetooth and 
infrared sensors to monitor where they are; and an accelerometer to record when 
they move.”8 That technology is capable of yielding “metrics such as time spent 
with people of the same sex, activity levels and the ratio of time spent speaking 
versus listening.”9 Another company sells a “happiness meter,” which can “infer 
mood levels from physical movement.”10 And a third takes email monitoring to 
a new level by scanning employees’ email to understand how their “sentiment 
changes over time.”11  
These technologies and the comprehensive information they offer about 
what employees do at work are not limited to office environments. Inviting 
inevitable comparisons to the “time and motion studies” that are key to 
Taylorism,12 Amazon reportedly patented a wearable device designed to track 
the speed and accuracy with which warehouse workers packed boxes.13 The 
 
 5. The Latest on Workplace Monitoring and Surveillance, AM. MGMT. ASS’N (Sept. 3, 2018, 
3:32 PM), https://www.amanet.org/training/articles/the-latest-on-workplace-monitoring-and-
surveillance.aspx [https://perma.cc/PUY7-QGR8]. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See National Workrights Institute, Privacy Under Siege: Electronic Monitoring in the 
Workplace at 9 https://epic.org/privacy/workplace/e-monitoring.pdf [https://perma.cc/VZ8T-MT 
ED] (collecting various surveys from the early 2000s). 
 8. There Will Be Little Privacy in the Workplace of the Future, THE ECONOMIST (Mar. 28, 
2018), https://www.economist.com/special-report/2018/03/28/there-will-be-little-privacy-in-the-
workplace-of-the-future [https://perma.cc/TP3B-BCKM]. 
 9. Id. (However, the article states that clients are not given information about individual 
employees, and that they instead receive only “team-level statistics”). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Michael C. Harper, The Continuing Relevance of Section 8(a)(2) to the Contemporary 
Workplace, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2322, 2341 (1998) (discussing the “essential aspects of Taylorism,” 
which result in workers being assigned simple, repetitive tasks, the pace of which are determined 
“by the speed of an assembly line or by quotas based on time and motion studies of workers by 
production engineer specialists”). 
 13. Ceylan Yeginsu, If Workers Slack Off, the Wristband Will Know. (And Amazon Has a 
Patent for It.), N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/01/technology/ 
amazon-wristband-tracking-privacy.html [https://perma.cc/6TDQ-JTQ9]. 
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device could also “nudge [workers] via vibrations” when it “judged that [they] 
were doing something wrong.”14 And while news of that patent made a splash, 
warehouse employees “said the company already used similar tracking 
technology in its warehouses,”15 which have—perhaps not coincidentally—
acquired reputations as punishing workplaces.16 For its part, Walmart patented 
an “audio surveillance technology that measures workers’ performance, and 
could even listen to their conversations with customers at checkout.”17 
According to the patent, the system would be sensitive enough to detect the 
length of a line at a cashier, or the speed at which groceries were being bagged.18  
Enterprises can also keep watch over freelancers and those who work 
partially from home, raising a different set of privacy concerns. For example, 
the platform Upwork “tracks hundreds of freelancers while they work by saving 
screenshots, measuring the frequency of their clicks and keystrokes, and even 
sometimes taking webcam photos of the workers.”19 Upwork then uses this 
information to determine how freelancers will be paid.20 Along the same lines, 
Uber introduced software designed to monitor drivers’ speed and other driving 
habits—a change with potential positive implications for safety, but also 
negative implications for drivers’ privacy and autonomy.21 Countless employers 
provide at least some of their employees with laptops or smartphones to take 
home with them; many of these devices contain recorders and cameras that can 
be triggered remotely, as well as the keyloggers and other trackers that have long 
been available. Finally, some employers issue Fitbits and other fitness and health 
tracking devices to their employees as part of “wellness” programs—these 
 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Dave Jamieson, The Life and Death of an Amazon Warehouse Temp, HUFFINGTON 
POST, https://highline.huffingtonpost.com/articles/en/life-and-death-amazon-temp/ (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2018) [https://perma.cc/J2FB-RVCB]; Nina Shapiro, Under Pressure, Afraid to Take 
Bathroom Breaks? Inside Amazon’s Fast-Paced Warehouse World, SEATTLE TIMES (July 2, 2018), 
https://www.seattletimes.com/business/amazon/under-pressure-afraid-to-take-bathroom-breaks-in 
side-amazons-fast-paced-warehouse-world/?utm_source=facebook&utm_medium=social&utm_ 
campaign=article_left_1.1 [https://perma.cc/PLP7-BBGM]. 
 17. Caroline O’Donovan, Walmart’s Newly Patented Technology for Eavesdropping on 
Workers Presents Privacy Concerns, BUZZFEED (Jul. 11, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/ 
article/carolineodonovan/walmart-just-patented-audio-surveillance-technology-for#.gia8Mn4Vg 
[https://perma.cc/LVS5-N9GW]. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Caroline O’Donovan, This “Creepy” Time-Tracking Software Is Like Having Your Boss 
Watch You Every Second, BUZZFEED (Aug. 7, 2018), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/ 
carolineodonovan/upwork-freelancers-work-diary-keystrokes-screenshot [https://perma.cc/67TZ-
VJFQ]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Michal Addady, Uber Is Starting to Monitor Drivers for Bad Behavior, FORTUNE (June 
29, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/06/29/uber-monitor-driving-behavior/ [https://perma.cc/TDL6-
2LFQ]. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] LABOR ORGANIZING IN THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 59 
devices collect data about employees’ physical activity, heart rates, and sleep 
patterns, including when they go to bed and get up.22  
Yet employees sometimes successfully resist new employer surveillance 
regimes. For example, Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford, and Jason Schultz open 
their important article, Limitless Worker Surveillance, with an anecdote in which 
journalists at the Daily Telegraph noticed that devices called “OccupEye” had 
been installed at every workstation.23 As the authors recount, “[e]mployees’ 
suspicion that OccupEye’s true purpose was mass surveillance of worker 
performance quickly led to public outrage, union pressure, and, ultimately, its 
ejection from the Telegraph building.”24 Further, employees who work in 
unionized workplaces will often be entitled to notice of, and an opportunity to 
bargain over, the imposition of new surveillance technology,25 giving them an 
opportunity to argue for limits on both the use of employer surveillance devices, 
and the purposes for which the data they gather can be used. And even non-
union employees who learn that their every move is being watched or listened 
to can express their displeasure in ways that range from mass walkouts to more 
subtle (and conscious or unconscious) slowdowns, to individual employees 
deciding to vote with their feet by quitting.26  
However, these responses are partial solutions at best—they will work only 
for employees who learn that they are being surveilled, and even then, only if 
they have enough leverage to successfully resist their employers. Solving this 
problem could be a job for labor law, which is intended to respond to workplace 
power imbalances, but it not yet up to the challenges that surveillance 
technology poses for workers’ collective action, including union organizing. The 
next section discusses the limitations of the NLRB’s surveillance doctrine, 
outlining the scope of labor law and describing how the NLRA fails to respond 
adequately to emerging worker surveillance techniques. 
 
 22. See Christopher Rowland, With Fitness Trackers in the Workplace, Bosses Can Monitor 
Your Every Step – and Possibly More, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost. 
com/business/economy/with-fitness-trackers-in-the-workplace-bosses-can-monitor-your-every-
step—and-possibly-more/2019/02/15/75ee0848-2a45-11e9-b011-d8500644dc98_story.html?utm 
_term=.af1e92eb3841 [https://perma.cc/VW26-P9AT]. 
 23. Ifeoma Ajunwa, Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Limitless Worker Surveillance,105 CAL. 
L. REV. 735, 737 (2017). 
 24. Id. 
 25. See Colgate-Palmolive Co., 323 N.L.R.B. 515, 517 (1997) (employer committed unfair 
labor practice by failing to bargain over installation of hidden surveillance cameras). 
 26. Recently, some employees at technology companies including Microsoft have organized 
around the ethical implications of some of their employers’ projects and clients, such as US 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Nitasha Tiku, Microsoft’s Ethical Reckoning is Here, 
WIRED (June 18, 2018, 8:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/microsofts-ethical-reckoning-is-
here/ [https://perma.cc/2HUG-XQ39]. See also Martin Skladany, Technology Unions: How 
Technology Employees Can Advocate for Internet Freedom, Privacy, Intellectual Property Reform, 
and the Greater Good, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 821 (2016). 
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III.  SURVEILLANCE AND THE NLRA27 
The NLRA protects the right of most private sector employees to “form, 
join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives 
of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose 
of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”28 Neither that core 
right nor the unfair labor practices enumerated in Section 8 of the NLRA29 
addresses employees’ privacy or employer surveillance explicitly. Still, it seems 
unimaginable that unlimited employer scrutiny of employees’ collective action 
could be consistent with the core of the NLRA’s protections, especially when 
employees are in the early stages of a union organizing drive—the potential for 
that collective action to be chilled because of employees’ reasonable fear of 
employer retaliation would be too great.30  
Accordingly, as one would expect, certain surveillance activities by 
employers have been illegal since the earliest days of the NLRA. In 1938, the 
Supreme Court considered an employer’s appeal from an NLRB unfair labor 
practice finding that related in part to the company’s “employment of industrial 
spies and undercover operatives.”31 The NLRB decision offered more detail 
about what that “employment of industrial spies” entailed:  
[Consolidated] engaged the detective services of Railway Audit and Inspection 
Company . . . from October 1933 through October 1936. . . . services rendered 
 
 27. As this heading suggests, this Article does not address any other sources of law that could 
potentially bear on the employment relationship, such as privacy torts or the Stored 
Communications Act. 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012). (Employees who are not covered by the NLRA, such as public 
sector workers, or agricultural or domestic employees, may receive similar protection under state 
law. However, these laws are largely outside of the scope of this Article. Public sector workers may 
also receive protection from surveillance under the Fourth Amendment to the US Constitution). 
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 765 (2010) (holding that city’s review of police officer’s 
text messages on department-issued cell phone was a search that was covered by the Fourth 
Amendment, but City’s search was reasonable). But see Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace 
Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277 (2012) (the “understanding that public employees have more 
privacy protection in the workplace than their private-sector counterparts has been placed in 
considerable doubt.”). On the other hand, values such as public accountability, public safety, or the 
need to check the coercive power of the state may justify certain intrusions that would be 
unpalatable (if not illegal) in the private sector. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge #7, 34 PERI 
¶ 178 at *1 (Ill. Lab. Rel. Bd., June 5, 2018), 2018 WL 3062486 (discussing whether public 
employer must bargain over police body-worn cameras); In re. Belleville Educ. Ass’n, No. A-2956-
15T3, 2018 WL 3421392 at *3–4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. July 16, 2018) (discussing whether 
public employer must bargain over audio and video recording devices intended to help with 
responses to school shootings). 
 29. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012). 
 30. See Kate Bronfenbrenner, Econ. Pol’y Inst., Briefing Paper 235, No Holds Barred: The 
Intensification of Employer Opposition to Organizing 27 (2009), https://www.epi.org/files/page/-
/pdf/bp235.pdf [https://perma.cc/QPL7-AG4E]. 
 31. Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 215 (1938). 
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. . . included investigation of the union activities of [Consolidated’s] employees. 
Frequently [Consolidated] would send circulars, leaflets, and other literature to 
the Inspection Company for investigation by its detectives. Among the various 
types of literature . . . were included the circulars and leaflets of the Independent 
Brotherhood [of Utility Employees], some of which contained the names of the 
leaders of that organization. Detectives . . . also covered several of the meetings 
and conventions of the Independent Brotherhood throughout the year 1935. . . .  
  . . . [D]etectives trailed Stephen L. Solosy . . . and Philemon Ewing, both 
organizers for the Independent Brotherhood . . . . The detective who trailed 
Solosy was given a picture of him and told to trial him, which he did for two 
days . . . .Solosy was unaware that he was being shadowed, but Ewing was 
exasperated by the ineptitude of the detective who trailed him . . . . Both Solosy 
and Ewing were discharged on January 17, 1936.32 
The Court agreed that the NLRB could bar the company from continuing to use 
“outside investigating agencies.”33 However, perhaps because the Railway 
Audit and Inspection Company detectives’ surveillance work was so extensive, 
neither the Court nor the NLRB discussed the scope or even the purposes of the 
NLRA’s protection against employer surveillance.  
Later cases and commentators sketched out the contours of that protection 
in greater detail. An employer’s direct observation of union activity—here, think 
of a supervisor recording names of employees wearing union insignia on their 
clothing at work, or keeping close watch on a picket line—becomes unlawful “if 
the observation goes beyond casual and becomes unduly intrusive.”34 “Indicia 
of coerciveness include the ‘duration of the observation, the employer’s distance 
from employees while observing them, and whether the employer engaged in 
other coercive behavior during its observation.’”35 Examples of surveillance that 
the NLRB has held violate the NLRA include watching employees with 
binoculars,36 watching union activity on a daily basis and for hours at a time,37 
posting guards in previously unguarded areas,38 photographing or videotaping 
employees and monitoring their phone calls in response to union activity,39 and 
 
 32. In re. Consol. Edison Co., 4 N.L.R.B. 71, 94–95 (1937). 
 33. Consol. Edison, 305 U.S. at 217. 
 34. Kenworth Truck Co., Inc., 327 N.L.R.B. 497, 501 (1999). 
 35. Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC, 366 N.L.R.B. No. 82, 2018 WL 2148472 at *5 (May 8, 2018) 
(quoting Alladin Gaming, LLC, 345 N.L.R.B. 585, 586 (2005)). 
 36. Cook Family Foods, Ltd., 311 N.L.R.B. 1299, 1301 (1993). 
 37. NLRB v. Collins & Aikman Corp., 146 F.2d 454, 455 (4th Cir. 1944). 
 38. S.J.P.R., Inc., 306 N.L.R.B. 172, 189 (1992). 
 39. Dep’t Store Div. of the Dayton Hudson Corp., 316 N.L.R.B. 477, 478 (1995); F.W. 
Woolworth Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1197 (1993). The NLRB has held that photographing or 
videotaping employees’ statutorily protected activities is a per se violation of the NLRA, unless the 
employer can “provide a solid justification” that the photography was required because of 
anticipated misconduct. Brasfield & Gorrie, LLC, 366 N.L.R.B. No. 82 at *5–6 (quoting Nat’l Steel 
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a manager beginning a new practice of sitting with employees at lunch or during 
breaks.40  
But surveillance qualifies as an unfair labor practice only if it involves more 
than an employer happening to see union activity taking place in public or in the 
open at work. Rather, the NLRB asks whether the employer’s conduct is “out of 
the ordinary” in a way that would tend “to interfere with, restrain or coerce 
employees[‘]” collective action.41 There are two significant aspects to this test: 
first, it is objective, requiring the NLRB to assess whether the challenged 
surveillance would interfere with, restrain, or coerce a reasonable or typical 
employee’s protected concerted activity.42 Second, it allows the employer to set 
the baseline: in general, employers can continue practices adopted before 
employees began to engage in concerted activity (usually a union drive), even if 
those practices later have the effect of allowing the employer to observe 
concerted activity once it begins.43 This means employers may implement 
surveillance programs for reasons other than deterring union organizing, such as 
promoting productivity or maintaining security. For example, the NLRB 
rejected the contention that an employer engaged in unlawful surveillance when, 
during an organizing drive, it slightly expanded an existing “good-night” policy, 
which entailed a member of senior management standing at the door at the end 
of the workday to ensure that employees had exited the building and that their 
packages were appropriately sealed to prevent theft.44 The “good-night policy,” 
wrote an administrative law judge in an opinion adopted by the NLRB, could 
not reasonably deter concerted activity because it was “a practice with which the 
employees had become fully familiar.”45  
Employees need not be aware of employer surveillance for it to violate the 
NLRA. For example, in one of the earliest cases dealing with this issue, the 
Ninth Circuit simply resorted to the text of the NLRA to affirm the Board’s 
decision that surreptitious surveillance could be an unfair labor practice even 
though employees did not discover it until after the fact, because “[c]asual 
examination of the dictionary discloses that a person may be interfered with, 
restrained, or coerced without knowing it.”46 Additionally, the NLRB will find 
 
& Shipbuilding Co., 324 N.L.R.B. 499, 499 (1997). But cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 98, 
101 (3d. Cir. 1982) (rejecting the NLRB’s per se approach in photographing cases). 
 40. Elano Corp., 216 N.L.R.B. 691, 695 (1975); Hawthorn Co., 166 N.L.R.B. 251, 251 (1967). 
See also Aladdin Gaming, 345 N.L.R.B. 585, 586-87 (2005) (discussing these and other cases). 
 41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012) (defining as unfair labor practice employer “interfere[nce] 
with, restrain[t], or coerc[ion]” with employees’ rights to engage in concerted activity); Metal 
Industries Inc., 251 N.L.R.B. 1523, 1523 (1980) (routine or casual observation of workplace 
activity does not rise to the level of unlawful surveillance). 
 42. The Broadway, 267 N.L.R.B. 385, 400 (1983). 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. at 389–90. 
 45. Id. at 400. 
 46. NLRB v. Grower-Shipper Vegetable Ass’n, 122 F.2d 368, 376 (9th Cir. 1941). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2018] LABOR ORGANIZING IN THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE 63 
an unfair labor practice when an employer attempts (but fails) to watch its 
employees’ union activity, such as by following an employee in the hope of 
learning the location of a union meeting that the employee does not ultimately 
attend.47 And it is also an unfair labor practice when an employer deliberately 
creates the impression of surveillance—even if no information is actually 
collected—such as by placing in a break room a security camera that does not 
contain a tape or that turns out to be broken, or having a supervisor sit in a car 
while observing union activity and talking on the phone, even if the conversation 
is not a report on the union activity.48 “The test in determining whether a 
statement constitutes creating the impression of surveillance is whether the 
employees could reasonably assume from the employer’s statements or conduct 
that their activities had been placed under surveillance.”49 
Taken as a whole, the NLRB’s surveillance doctrine reveals at least two 
general purposes. First, increased employer surveillance in response to union 
activity can have a chilling effect on that activity because employees will 
reasonably fear that the surveillance has been implemented in order to facilitate 
later retaliation by the employer—this explains why employers can violate the 
NLRA simply by creating the impression of surveillance, but without engaging 
in it.50 Second, employer surveillance can give employers an unfair advantage 
in opposing an organizing drive, or facilitate other unfair labor practices, 
including retaliation against union supporters. This explains why employers’ 
surreptitious surveillance also violates the NLRA.  
Although the tools available for employer surveillance have changed 
significantly, the NLRB’s approach to surveillance cases has mostly remained 
the same. For example, the NLRB folded videography into its rule on employer 
photography of concerted activity without modifying the rule to account for 
differences between the two technologies.51 In another case involving new(er) 
surveillance technology, MEK Arden, a supervisor (erroneously) told an 
employee that the workplace had voice-activated cameras, leading the employee 
to believe that her speech and that of other employees would be recorded.52 The 
NLRB concluded that “suggesting to an employee that the cameras were being 
used to monitor their activities” was an unfair labor practice.53  
 
 47. NLRB v. Nueva Eng’g, Inc., 761 F.2d 961, 967 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 48. Cal. Acrylic Indus., 322 N.L.R.B. 41, 59 (1996) (“whether a video tape was actually in 
Saldana’s video camera or whether he actually pressed down on the record button . . . the ‘chilling 
effect’ of such on Respondent’s employees’ Section 7 rights was the same.”). See also Eddyleon 
Chocolate Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 887, 887–88 (1991). 
 49. MEK Arden, LLC, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 109, 2017 WL 3229289 at *19 (July 25, 2017). 
 50. Cal. Acrylic Indus., 322 N.L.R.B. at 59. 
 51. F.W. Woolworth Co., 310 N.L.R.B. 1197, 1197 (1993). 
 52. MEK Arden, LLC, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 109 at *18–19. 
 53. Id. at 19. 
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The NLRB’s most significant recent discussion of the intersection of 
surveillance and new technology came in a case known as Purple 
Communications, in which the NLRB held that employees had a presumptive 
right to use their work-issued email accounts to engage in collective action under 
certain conditions, including that employees limit their email concerted activity 
to non-working time.54 Of course, as discussed above, many employers already 
monitor their employees’ use of email, creating a potential conflict between 
employees’ concerted activity and employers’ desire to implement surveillance 
measures designed to monitor productivity.55 The Purple Communications 
majority acknowledged as much—but stated that such a conflict could be 
resolved by applying its existing law on employee surveillance: “We are 
confident, however, that we can assess any surveillance allegations by the same 
standards that we apply to alleged surveillance in the bricks-and-mortar 
world.”56 Then, the NLRB added the following: 
An employer’s monitoring of electronic communications on its email system 
will similarly be lawful so long as the employer does nothing out of the ordinary, 
such as increasing its monitoring during an organizational campaign or focusing 
its monitoring efforts on protected conduct or union activists. Nor is an employer 
ordinarily prevented from notifying its employees, as many employers also do 
already, that it monitors (or reserves the right to monitor) computer and email 
use for legitimate management reasons and that employees may have no 
expectation of privacy in their use of the employer’s email system.57 
There are at least two ways to view this brief discussion. One is as a practical 
suggestion about how the NLRB would respond to an as-yet-theoretical problem 
raised in the context of a highly controversial case. But the other is as a missed 
opportunity: the NLRB could have signaled its openness to considering whether 
a law of employer surveillance that was designed for the real world is really 
appropriate for the digital world. In line with the second view, Professor Jeffrey 
Hirsch praised the main result in Purple Communications, but criticized the 
discussion of surveillance: “email monitoring can provide employers with 
information that is useful for legal attempts to thwart collective action . . . . while 
electronic collective action provides many benefits to employees, it also exposes 
those efforts in ways that traditional coordination does not.”58 Thus, Hirsch 
identified three specific problems with the NLRB’s approach: first, that 
“[u]nlike picketing or other types of public acts, there is typically a veneer of 
privacy that attaches to email;” second, that the NLRB’s approach effectively 
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encourages employers to prophylactically adopt a broad monitoring policy; and 
third, that by carefully monitoring and searching their employees’ computer use, 
employers might be able to discover information such as passwords to protected 
social media sites—which might in turn lead the employer to discover additional 
information about employees’ concerted activity, among other private 
information.59  
Because of Purple Communication’s context, the problems that Hirsch 
identified involve employers’ monitoring of employees’ computer use. But other 
types of new surveillance technology will raise equally sticky problems. I 
describe some of those problems in the next section, but the bottom line is that 
the NLRB’s current approach, which essentially ignores surveillance adopted 
for purposes such as deterring theft or promoting productivity, is not up to 
dealing with emerging intrusive forms of workplace surveillance. 
I.  UPDATING LABOR LAW TO RESPOND TO SURVEILLANCE TECHNOLOGY 
Some of the implications of surveillance technology for employers looking 
to prevent their employees from unionizing or engaging in other collective 
action are readily apparent. For example, Walmart’s patented audio surveillance 
system, if implemented, would allow the company to listen not just for bagging 
speed, but also for employees talking about the Organization United for Respect 
at Walmart (“OUR Walmart”), which is sponsored by the United Food and 
Commercial Workers International Union.60 Add to that Walmart’s well-known 
history of anti-union tactics (including employee surveillance),61 and one can 
easily foresee that Walmart workers might curtail any talk of OUR Walmart, or 
even of any dissatisfaction with their treatment by their employer—even though 
the NLRA protects such talk, provided that it is confined to non-working time.62 
Yet, as discussed above, the NLRA would have little to say about Walmart’s 
decision to implement a surveillance system for the purposes of productivity 
enhancement, even though chilling employees’ collective action would be a 
foreseeable result. 
Newer methods and habits of work could also extend this chilling effect 
beyond the workplace’s physical boundaries. For example, when employers 
issue computers and cell phones to their workforce, they may either welcome or 
tolerate the use of these devices for employees’ personal communications. 
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Employees could reasonably see this practice as an office “perk,” but it also 
makes communicating free from employer surveillance difficult. Even if some 
employees are meticulous about using non-work devices, email addresses, and 
networks when typing something they don’t want the boss to know about, the 
likelihood that everyone else with whom they communicate will follow the same 
protocol is low. The result will be that employers who are determined to learn 
what their employees are doing and saying will almost certainly succeed—and, 
perhaps more important, savvy employees will know that they cannot expect 
their communications to remain secret from their employers. Relatedly, where 
employees carry smartphones or other GPS-enabled devices, they could fear that 
their employers will track who attends union meetings, or even which employees 
get together outside of work, making informal networks among employees 
visible to the employer. 
There is also the possibility that employer surveillance will generally deter 
employees from talking with each other during the work day, even when their 
conversations would not relate to working conditions or collective action. This 
deterrence could result from employer audio recording, or from strict 
productivity quotas or monitoring intended to prevent “goofing off.” One 
predictable result would be that employees will not get to know each other very 
well. If that happens, there could be ramifications of many sorts—employees 
might enjoy their jobs less, their well-being might suffer, and they may become 
less likely to turn to each other to discuss workplace problems. Professor 
Michael Oswalt has discussed the importance of trust among workers as a 
prerequisite to collective action of any sort, but especially the spur-of-the-
moment protests that are more likely in un-organized workplaces than unionized 
ones.63 As he put it, “the connective quality that matters most [to 
“improvisational” collective action] is trust, specifically a special sort of trust—
the kind built up over time through repeated, relaxed, informal interactions.”64 
Finally, a combination of pre-hire personality tests and workplace happiness 
monitoring could help employers avoid hiring the sort of worker who might be 
prone to collective action in the first place, and then respond on an individual 
basis to employees who become unhappy during their tenure, either by 
improving their pay or other working conditions, or by firing them. The net 
result will be that worker grievances will become less likely to catalyze 
collective action that could lead to improvements for all of an employer’s 
employees. Developing this argument, Nathan Newman has persuasively 
reasoned both that personality tests and workplace monitoring are likely to result 
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in lower pay for workers as a whole, and that these techniques may violate the 
NLRA’s prohibitions on polling employees about their union sympathies.65 
But if a union drive does begin—as occurred among Uber drivers in 
Seattle—the employer would be able to easily reach employees at home by 
sending notifications containing the employers’ messages, links to podcasts 
discussing the union drive from the employer’s perspective, and more to 
employees’ devices.66 While an employer’s physical visit to an employee’s 
home could be deemed a reason to order a new union election, the same is not 
(yet) true of an electronic visit—yet the electronic visit, perhaps even more than 
the physical visit, could arrive at a time when the worker was especially 
susceptible to suggestion, and with content the worker is especially likely to 
accept.67 
What could labor law do about all this? The answer to this question is 
multifaceted, but one aspect is clear: the NLRB should not simply apply case 
law that was developed for detectives holding clipboards, or even workplace 
cameras, to the emerging workplace surveillance technology discussed in Part 
II. As Professor Hirsch outlined in the context of employee email monitoring, 
the problem with that approach is that it does not grapple with the fact that 
employers can learn vastly more information, and more useful information, 
about their employees’ actual and potential collective action through these new 
technologies than through previous methods of workplace surveillance. 68 
Charles Craver has proposed that employers should be required to disclose 
the extent of their workplace surveillance and the specific activities that this 
surveillance is intended to deter, and also that monitoring authority be vested in 
particular pre-designated individuals, who are in turn subject to strict rules about 
what they can disclose about what they see or hear, and to whom.69 And Ariana 
Levinson has suggested a set of rules designed to mimic the protections that 
apply to workers who are already unionized and living under a typical collective 
bargaining agreement.70 These include notice of monitoring under most 
circumstances and limits on surreptitious monitoring, and allowing employees 
to respond before imposing discipline based on activity learned through 
 
 65. Nathan Newman, Reengineering Workplace Bargaining: How Big Data Drives Lower 
Wages and How Reframing Labor Law Can Restore Information Equality in the Workplace, 85 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 693, 738–39 (2017). 
 66. See Heidi Groover, As Seattle Uber Drivers Try to Unionize, the Company Doubles Down 
on a Scare Campaign, THE STRANGER (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.thestranger.com/news/2016/ 
12/07/24731875/can-uber-convince-its-drivers-they-dont-need-a-union [https://perma.cc/6PCD-9 
NGL]. 
 67. Ryan Calo, Digital Market Manipulation, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 995, 1017 (2014). 
 68. Hirsh, supra note 60 at 955–56. 
 69. Charles B. Craver, Privacy Issues Affecting Employers, Employees, and Labor 
Organizations, 66 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1076 (2006). 
 70. Ariana R. Levinson, Industrial Justice: Privacy Protection for the Employed, 18 CORNELL 
J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 629, 656 (2009). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
68 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:55 
surveillance. Although these proposals were designed with general employee 
privacy concerns in mind, rather than a focus on preserving the conditions 
necessary for union organizing, they could also help curb the chilling effects that 
employer surveillance can have on collective action. 
In addition, the NLRB (or Congress) should consider an additional measure, 
designed to balance employer needs and real concerns about chilling employees’ 
collective action in the context of specific workplaces.71 Specifically, the NLRB 
should adopt a new set of presumptions for evaluating intrusive employer 
surveillance that predictably balance employer and employee needs.72 Under 
such a framework, the NLRB would presumptively bar some of the most 
intrusive workplace surveillance techniques unless employers can show they are 
necessary because of special circumstances. Conversely, the framework would 
presumptively permit less intrusive forms of surveillance under two conditions: 
first, the employer’s demonstration of a legitimate purpose for their 
implementation; and second, that employees cannot show that they were adopted 
or are being deployed to deter protected concerted activity. 
II.  CONCLUSION 
The digital revolution is not yet done transforming work, and it is 
unpredictable where the combination of emerging automation and artificial 
intelligence theories will lead. But labor law’s approach to policing workplace 
surveillance is not yet ready to meet these challenges. In particular, the NLRA’s 
current indifference to employers’ baseline choices regarding workplace 
surveillance in non-union workplaces is inadequate, because new surveillance 
methods yield much more and much better information for employers aiming to 
nip workers’ concerted activity in the bud. An updated legal regime would at 
minimum involve notice rights, but should also force employers to justify their 
surveillance choices, and facilitate worker input into those choices.  
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